

VII

HIGHER EDUCATION AND GROWING SOCIAL INEQUALITY IN BRAZIL IN NEOLIBERAL TIMES

Valdemar Sguissardi

Education in general and, in particular, higher education in a country cannot be approached without situating them in their close relationships with the socioeconomic context in which they are inserted (Sguissardi, 2015).

Introduction

Seven years ago, July 2013, when writing for a collection – which would be published in Brazil and Germany (Sguissardi, 2015) – on the subject of higher education (ES) in Brazil, having as axes of analysis social inequalities, the process of commodification of this level of education and the challenges of its state regulation of public character, concluded, with some hope, that if there was any positive reversal in the democratization of ES, from advances in the democratization of the country – reduction of social inequality, for example – this could possibly depend on the success of the popular mobilizations that were then only starting in the country.

Such mobilizations, which began motivated by left-wing fighting flags – yells for the reduction in the value of urban transport passes, and others – gradually had their direction taken by right-wing leaders, with the support of the mainstream media, with the support of the media, with the support of the government, and opposition to the federal government – the 4th Term of the Workers' Party, connected with a range of parties of center-right, center-left and left. Three years later, these extended demonstrations, with the strengthening of the Presidency of the Chamber of Congressmen and the consent of the Judiciary, led to the presidential impeachment on 08/31/2016. As a result of this – seen by many jurists as an effective coup d'état – he took power, until the end of the second term of the deposed president (Dilma Rousseff/2014–2018), a right-wing political group and, in October 2018, was elected, to take power in January 2019, a president with clear political traits of the far right. From the economic point of view, it was possible to characterize the almost two and a half years of the interim government (Sep/2016–Dec/ 2018) as being of sharp neoliberal traits, and a government of advanced principles and actions from January 2019.¹ To

¹ The most important minister of the Bolsonaro government has always been presented, both by the President and by the press, and is, alongside the Minister of Justice, Sérgio Moro (former judge of Operation Lava Jato), the Minister of Economy Paulo Guedes. Paulo Guedes holds a degree in Economics from UFMG, Master and Doctor in Economics from *Chicago University*, where he then pointed out the neoliberal exponent Milton Friedman. Returning from Chicago and after a period of teaching at PUC-Rio, Paulo Guedes invited by the head of the Department of Economics of the University of Chile, who would become the Minister of Economy of General Pinochet, spent long years as a member of the economic team of this Government alongside his Minister of Economy. Among others of his experiences, in Chile, is his participation in the implementation of the Pension Reform of that country. Note that his first major performance, as Minister of Economy of Government

demonstrate it, both in this case and in that case, it would be enough to briefly present to the reader some of the main Constitutional amendments and laws approved by the National Congress (CN), from the impeachment of 2016 to 2020, and the content of one of the PEC's that are currently being processed in this same CN, the initiative of the executive or parliamentary power.

Also in December 2016, three months after this impeachment, the Constitutional Amendment (EC) n. 95 (Brasil, 2016), which instituted the New Fiscal Regime in the scope of the Fiscal Budgets and Social Security of the Federal Government, was promulgated by the CN, on the proposal of the Interim President Temer, according to which the freezing, for 20 years, of primary expenditure of the Federal Executive Branch was imposed, including those for health and education. These losses can only undergo annual readjustments according to the inflation of the period measured by the IPCA (Broad National Consumer Index). Particular attention is drawn to the fact that the annual amounts of the Federal Government's budget for the payment of interest, charges and amortization of public debt to the financial system, which usually amount to around 45% of the total, are not subject to such freezing, and these percentages may even be, increased in case of possible excess of collection.²

On March 31st, 2017, Law no. 13.429 was passed, which established unrestricted outsourcing of work, that is, both for complementary activities - res (existing legislation) and for essential ones (Brasil, 2017a). On July 13th, 2017, Law number 13.467, of Labor Reform (Brasil, 2017b) was approved, which amended more than 100 articles of the Consolidation of Labor Laws (CLT), removing many of the workers' rights.³ It is necessary to note that this loss of labor rights has been aggravated even more with the edition of Provisional Measure (MP) 905, of November 11th, 2019, which created a new form of hiring workers, with which sub-employment is also promoted.⁴

On November 12th, 2019, the Constitutional Amendment (EC) number 103 was promulgated, which amends the current social security system and establishes a set of transitional rules. Both the EC 103, promulgated, and the PEC 287/2016 – an inconclusive

Bolsonaro, was the defense of the Constitutional Amendment Proposal (PEC) of the Pension Reform, very similar to the Chilean Reform, a reform that would end the Brazilian Social Security Model of "solidarity" and proposed to replace it a Pension model of "capitalization" or individual (see later in the text).

² One of the main consequences of the EC-95, for the field of education, is the infeasibility of several of the goals of the National Education Plan (PNE)–2014–2024, among which the one that provided for the destination, for this field, by 2024, of 10% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), percentage that today is around 5%.

³ 1) Collective agreements (with union participation) on working hours are now dependent on individual agreements without trade union participation; 2) The holidays that could be divided into two periods can now be divided into three; 3) Intermittent work was instituted, i.e. non-continuous work contracts, paid per hour; 4) The trade union contribution became optional; 5) Pregnant and lactating women may work in an unhealthy environment provided that the risk – low or medium – is certified by a doctor of the company; 6) Restriction of access to free justice: the worker will have to pay the employer's fees and procedural costs, if he or she fails to hearings and loses labor actions; 7) Activities within the company will no longer be considered part of the working day such as rest, study, feeding, interaction among colleagues, personal hygiene and exchange of uniforms; 8) The job and wage plans do not need to be included in the employment contract or be approved by the Ministry of Labor, but only negotiated between employers and workers, and can be changed constantly; 9) the time spent by the worker, going back and forth at work, will not be part of the working day; 10) the end of the free assistance on termination of the employment contract.

⁴ Among other changes: 1) The Green and Yellow Card was established: the workers hired through it will not have the rights provided for in the CLT and in the Collective Conventions, with wages of up to a minimum and a half wage, that is, they will be sub-employed; 2) FGTS will be reduced from 8% to 2% per month and the fine for dismissal without cause will fall from 40% to 20%; Holidays, 13th Salary and FGTS will be divided into up to 12 installments...

attempt by the Temer Government to reform Social Security – aimed to replace the solidarity social security model, seen in the country – in which the beneficiaries are financed by all the workers – pains of the asset –, by a regime called capitalization, in which each worker would be responsible for the formation of a “savings” that would guarantee his or her future pension, in addition to an increase in the minimum retirement age and other changes. This “savings” would be managed by public or private banks that would profit, for many years, and in a customary manner, in the financial market, while workers (and only those who are in charge) would also have, as a rule, corrections to their extremely limited savings.

After about five months of processing and debates in the CN, EC 103 was approved, without its most feared trait by the workers – the “capitalization” – but with profound changes in the current regime until then.⁵ These changes are so profound and so damaging to workers in need of social security benefits that the Minister of Economy has always alarmed that his approval, in the terms in which it was, would generate, in 10 years, A savings of R\$ 800 billion in the coffers of the Union.

Among the PEC’s in progress in the CN, the initiative of the Executive Power/Ministry of Economy, it is worth making reference to PEC 188/2019-Senate, also known as the “Federative Pact”, which Nelson C. Amaral, in a detailed analysis of his 12 measures, considers the one that best expresses “The ultraliberal dimension of the group in the federal government” and would constitute “a disaster for Brazilian social policies” (Amaral, 2020, p. 197).

In his analysis, Amaral begins by stating that this PEC proposes a series of changes to the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF-1988) by amending, including or excluding articles, paragraphs, as well as by revoking several of their provisions. The “ultraliberal” dimension of the group in power, proposed by this PEC, would prove, for example, to be

[...] By not wanting to establish multi-annual plans, unlink as much financial resources as possible to social policies, and transfer to states, the Federal District and municipalities the responsibilities to reduce social inequalities; on the other hand, when managing the resources of the public fund, collected from the Brazilian population, it transfers public resources to the private sector to carry out social actions and provide, with all possible releases, the financial expenses associated with the financial capital (Amaral, 2020, p. 198).

Then, based on the summary of Nelson Amaral’s analysis of this PEC 188 and almost *ipsis litteris*, some of the changes to CF-1988 suggested by this PEC: 1) End of linking of financial resources to health and education, independently, that is, there would be a joint link between the financial resources applied to health and education; 2) End of supplementary educational, school, transport, food and health care programs by the Federal

⁵ 1) Increase in the minimum retirement age: 62 years of age and 15 contribution to women and 65 years and 20 years of contribution to men (little diverse rule for public servants, and a few other professions such as teachers and police); 2) Significant change in the calculation of the benefit, which may not be less than the minimum wage but not more than R\$ 5,839.45 monthly today; 3) The rates will become progressive, that is, the ones who earn the most will pay more, going from 7.5% to 22%; 4) Change in the rules of the pension for death: 50% of the amount of retirement, plus 10% per dependent until 100% (there are exceptions); 5) there is limitation when there is accumulation of benefit; 6) a large set of transition rules was established.

Government, which must be implemented by the states, Federal District and municipalities, with resources from the contribution of the Wage-Education which, according to this PEC, would be fully transferred to these institutions; 3) End of the obligation for federated entities to expand the public education network, and public resources may be applied in private schools; 4) When the public debt exceeds capital expenditure, there may be a reduction in wages and workload of public servants of the federal states – Federal Government, states and Federal District and municipality –, a reduction that may reach 25%, in addition to that, it is established by this PEC that the salaries of public servants will no longer have mandatory annual readjustments; 5) Additional rules are proposed to those of EC 95/2016, regarding the freezing of compulsory primary expenditure, that is, when they reach 95% of the total, their adjustment for the inflation of the previous period will be suspended as foreseen by that EC; 6) Articles 46 to 60 of Law 12.351 of 12/22/2010, which defined the Social Fund of Pre-salt and which allocated part of the financial resources of oil and natural gas exploration for health and education, and therefore, the percentages established by Law 12.858 of 09/09/2013, which allocated 75% of resources for basic education and 25% for health; 7) Article 5 of Complementary Law 141, of 01/13/2012, thus removing the link of resources applied in population health actions to GDP growth; 8) alongside constitutional social rights – health, education, food, work, housing, etc. – It is proposed the creation of the “right to intergenerational fiscal balance” which, eventually, can be used, by the rulers, to block the full satisfaction of those rights; 9) the obligation to draw up multiannual plans is required; 10) Forms of intervention are proposed in the current autonomy of federated entities, such as in the distribution of resources associated with oil and natural gas, which would be linked to “[...] indicators of results of the states, Federal District and municipalities”, etc. (Amaral, 2020, p. 198–201).

A number of other PEC's and provisional measures were under way in 2019 and early 2020, dealing with the most different issues, including those related to tax reform, which should further accentuate the neoliberal brands intensified liberals of power holders since the impeachment of 2016 and their socioeconomic policies.

In this text, aforementioned, of July 2013, as highlighted in the header, it was written that, “Education in general and, specially, higher education in a country cannot be approached without situating them in their close relationships with the socioeconomic context in which they are inserted (Sguissardi, 2015).

Both in 2013 and today, this methodological guideline remains valid and with total theoretical/explanatory relevance. Then, they examined the relationships between social and educational inequalities; the private/commercial and oligopolized expansion of ES; and the vicissitudes of public regulation within a semi-public or semi-private state. In this text, it is intended to show how, from the presidential impeachment (Aug/2016) to the passage of 2019/2020 – as it has been happening for decades or since the Empire – ES continues to maintain a very close relationship with the immense social inequality in the country and thus eventually, to the extent of the country's social inequality. the reproduction and contributing to, in its way, aggravate the absence of effective democracy in Brazilian society, which is reflected, especially, by this increasing inequality.

Before everything, it is necessary to emphasize which is not democratic in society where the social inequalities and infinite differences of opportunities, for example, of access to the ES of individuals belonging to their different social classes are immeasurable. If we

engage only in the educational field, not half of the Brazilian population aged 15 to 18 years does not even complete high school, and about 80% of young people aged 18 to 24 have access to any of the approximately 2,500 institutions in ES, of which, more than 2,000 are simple isolated colleges distributed throughout the national territory, and many of them are free or charging seemingly modest prices. As you will see, the access of only about 1/5 of the population of the adequate age group to higher education depends much less on family or personal disposition/will than on absolute lack of socioeconomic conditions of the vast majority of the population.

A sample of the immense Brazilian social inequality

Six Brazilians concentrate the same wealth as the poorest 100 million in the country, about half of the Brazilian population (*The distance that unites us*, Oxfam–Brasil).

In 2019, Brazil was one of the five most populous countries in the world (about 210 million inhabitants) and one of the ten largest gross domestic product (R\$ 7.3 trillion or about US\$ 1.5 trillion), but at the same time it was among the top ten, among the around 200 countries in the world, in social inequality, of which income concentration is one of its main aspects, as will be seen below.

As for the current ethnic-racial composition of the Brazilian population and its evolution (abbreviated) since the official end of the slave regime (05/13/1888), the data in table 1 below are observed.

It is important to note the changes that occurred in the last 19 years, from 2000 to 2019: If, in 2000, the white self-declared population was 8.4 points per cent more numerous than that of the afro descendants (black and brown); in 2019, it is the self-declared afro-descendants that overlap whites by 13.4 percentage points. A change of 21.8 percentage points.

Table 1 – Ethnic-racial composition in Brazil according to the Demographic Census of 1890, 2000 and PNAD 2019


Year	Population (Million)	White %	Black %	Brown %	Indigenous %	Yellow %
1890	14	44.0	14.6	32.4**	9,0*	–
2000	170	53.4	6.1	38.9	0.4	0.5
2019	210	42.8	9.4	46.8	0.4	1.1

Source: Assembly of the author from data from the Revista *Retratos*, IBGE, n. 11, of May 2018. For 2019, the data are from PNAD (self-declaration).

* In the 1890 census, the term cabocla would have been used in reference to ethnicity-in-breed. ** In the 1890 census, instead of brown, the term mestizo was used.


The concentration of income, as an essential trait of social inequality, can be demonstrated in several ways. The charts below – the 1, which includes the participation of the country's richest 10% with those of the US, China and France; and 2, which shows the participation in national income of the richest 10%, the intermediate 40% and the poorest 50% – would suffice to show such a concentration.

Chart 1 – Resilient inequality: participation of the richest 10% in national income by country, in percentage



Source: Costa (2017)

Chart 2 – Participation in national income in Brazil in percentage



Source: Costa (2017)

Another way to demonstrate social inequality and the concentration of its own is through staggered presentation of per capita household income, based on data from the Synthesis of Social Indicators (SIS) of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), as done with tables 2 and 3 below.

Table 2 – Per capita household income in Brazil from 2012 to 2018

Household income per capita	Number of People						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
No income	1,975,290	1,793,241	1,607,704	1,824,543	2,248,477	2,473,068	2,492,916
Greater than 0 and lower than or equal to 1/4 S.M.	21,530,661	20,124,149	17,684,744	19,056,338	21,667,142	21,433,256	22,020,758
Greater than 4 and lower than or equal to 1/4 1/2 S.M.	39,703,329	37,857,310	36,977,192	37,707,222	38,428,516	36,683,842	36,562,768
Greater than 1/2 and lower than or equal to 1 S.M.	59,258,700	60,372,447	61,494,678	61,629,008	60,913,286	58,735,365	58,791,269
Greater than 1 and lower than or equal to 2 S.M.	45,629,199	47,819,760	49,637,861	50,073,569	48,648,866	53,789,229	52,974,465
Greater than 2 and lower than or equal to 3 S.M.	13,431,972	13,947,430	15,273,188	14,799,071	14,717,304	15,044,497	15,788,468
Greater than 3 and lower than or equal to 5 S.M.	8,691,276	9,763,201	10,048,150	10,136,350	9,811,536	9,686,183	10,594,893
Higher than 5 S.M.	7,308,573	7,770,711	8,440,446	7,500,899	7,971,873	8,037,471	8,725,206
Total	197,529,000	199,249,000	200,963,000	202,727,000	204,407,000	206,089,000	207,743,000

Source: Summary of Social Indicators – SIS, IBGE. Available at: www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadores-sociais.html?edicao=18830&t=download (Elaboração de Nelson C. Amaral)

Table 3 – Per capita household income in Brazil from 2012 to 2018

Household income per capita	Percentage						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
No income	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2
Higher than 0 and lower or equal to 1/4 S.M.	10.9	10.1	8.8	9.4	10.6	10.4	10.6
Higher than 1/4 and lower or equal to 1/2 S.M.	20.1	19.0	18.4	18.6	18.8	17.8	17.6
Higher than 1/2 and lower or equal to 1 S.M.	30.0	30.3	30.6	30.4	29.8	28.5	28.3
Greater than 1 and lower than or equal to 2 S.M.	23.1	24.0	24.7	24.7	23.8	26.1	25.5
Higher than 2 and lower or equal to 3 S.M.	6.8	7.0	7.6	7.3	7.2	7.3	7.6
Higher than 3 and lower or equal to 5 S.M.	4.4	4.9	5.0	5.0	4.8	4.7	5.1
Greater than 5 S.M.	3.7	3.9	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.2

Source: Summary of Social Indicators – SIS, IBGE. Available at: www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9221-sintese-de-indicadores-sociais.html?edicao=18830&t=download (Elaboração de Nelson C. Amaral)

In addition to the absolute figures (Table 2), note the breakdown of per capita household income over the course of these seven years by the percentages represented by them (Table 3).

However, it should be noted that the minimum wage in force in February 2018, of R\$ 954.00, corresponds to less than 1/3 of the ideal minimum wage that according to the Interunion Department of Statistics and Socio-economic Studies (Dieese) should be R\$ 3,683.67 or 3.86 times that. According to the Federal Constitution of 1988, the SM should supply the sixth basic and needs of housing, health, education, clothing, hygiene, Transportation, leisure and social security (Brasil Econômico, 2018b).

Based on the data from table 2 and divide the population among people of all ages who lived (survived) with up to one SM and those who lived with more than one SM, we will have:

Table 4 – Per capita household income in Brazil from 2012 to 2018

Household income per capita	Percentage						
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
No incomes, greater than 0 and lower or equal to 1 S.M.	62.0	60.3	58.6	59.3	60.3	57.9	57.7
Greater than 1 and lower than or equal to 5 S.M.	34.3	35.9	37.3	37.0	35.8	38.1	38.2
Greater than 5 S.M.	3.7	3.9	4.2	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.2

Source: Summary of Social Indicators – SIS, IBGE (Author's elaboration based on data from table 3).

If taken as the basis of the ideal SM (Dieese) and added the data of the last two rows of table 3 above, it would have only 7% to 8% of the population with a per capita income higher than the constitutional SM.

Pnud – IDH

Among the 189 countries in the world that have measured, by the United Nations Development Program (Undp), its Human Development Index (HDI) – based on health, education and income indicators – Brazil occupied, in 2018, the 79th position, with an HDI of 0.761. In South America it was ranked 4th, tied with Colombia, far from the first three months: Chile (42nd), Argentina (48th) and Uruguay (57th) (G1.globo.com, 2019).

However, the situation in the country is much more serious when UNDP data on HDI “adjusted to inequalities” from a list of 150 countries are verified. In this case, Brazil, with an index of 0.574, becomes 102nd.

In South America, the country was the second most lost in HDI [2018] due to the adjustment made by inequality, behind only Paraguay (which was from the 98th position, with 0.724, to the 112nd position, with 0.545) (G1.globo.com, 2019).⁶

Undp also assesses gender disparities – via Gender Development Index – in 166 countries. “The HDI for women showed that Brazilians are in better health and education conditions than men, but they are below when the subject is gross income.” (G1.globo.com, 2019). Women have an average of 8.1 years of study against 7.6 of men, “[...] however, the per capita gross national income of women is 41.5% lower than that of men. In dollars, this amount is equivalent to US\$ 10,432 per year against US\$ 17,827 for men” (G1.globo.com, 2019). This should be added to the higher rate of female unemployment and underemployment compared to male, as it will be seen below.

Gini Coefficient

Another way to measure the social inequality of a country is by measuring the Gini coefficient or Index. Its indicators are the income, wealth and education. The closer to 1, the greater the inequality and vice versa.

According to Daniela Amorim, from *O Estado de S. Paulo* (2020), the unequal income from the labor market reached a record level in 2019. In annual terms, the inequality pointed out by Gini Index, from 2015 to 2019, reaching the index of 0.629 compared to 0.6279 in the previous year, 2018.⁷

⁶ When making this type of classification, the Undp presents indicators to measure income distribution among the population: “participation in the income of the poorest 40%, participation in the income of the richest 10% and participation in the income of the richest 1%. With this information, the report pointed out that **almost a third of all the wealth in Brazil is concentrated in the hands of the richest 1%.** It is the second largest concentration of income in the world, only behind Qatar.” (G1.globo.com, 2019).

⁷ “The survey takes into account the microdata on income and occupation of the National Continuous Household Sample Survey (PNAD), calculated by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE)” (Amorim, 2020).

Unemployment and underemployment

Unemployment and underemployment data for 2018 remained stable until mid-2019. These, therefore, will be taken as a reference.


According to IBGE data, reported by Brasil Econômico website (2018), in the middle of this year there would be no work for 27.6 million people in Brazil, that is, for about 28% of the economically active population that was a little more than 100 million people. This number “[...] is part of the rate of underutilization of the labor force composed of unemployed and overcome by insufficient hours” (Brasil Econômico, 2018). There are significant regional differences: while in the state of Piauí this rate was 40%, in Santa Catarina was 10.9%.

The “disheartened”, that is, those who gave up trying a wave of nail, amounted to 4.4% of the workforce, or about 4.5 million people, the highest rate in the historical series since 2012. In the state of Alagoas, Brasil Econômico website reports (2018), this rate reached 16.6%, almost four times the national average. In Santa Catarina this rate was only 0.7%.

Unemployment in the second quarter of 2018 was 13 million people (12.4%). However, the distribution of rates by state and region are very unequal: in the state of Amapá it was 21.3%, in Alagoas, 17.3%, and in Santa Catarina, 6.5%, and Mato Grosso do Sul, 7.6%, that is, those far above and this far below the national average of 12.4% (Brasil Econômico, 2018).

Chart 3 below, with data from Continuous IBGE/PNAD, shows the evolution of the unemployment rate in Brazil, from Jan–Feb–Mar 2012 to Jan–Feb–Mar 2020. The lowest rate occurred in the last quarter of 2013 and the highest in the first quarter of 2017, expected to be exceeded from the second quarter of 2020 due, especially, to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Chart 3 – Disoccupation rate, by sex, from the 1st quarter of 2012 to the 1st quarter of 2020



Source: IBGE – National Survey by Quarterly Continuous Household Sample (2020).

As it can be seen, the data from Chart 3 above confirm the UNDP's data when assessing gender disparities – via Gender Development Index. In the 8 years or about 30

quarters, the indices of female disoccupation are, with small variations, 40% higher than the indices of male disoccupation.

In the second quarter of 2018, women were the majority of working age: 52.4% of the total and in all regions. However, out of every 100 employed, 56.3 were men, and in the North they were 60.2%. Of the total unemployed (12.4%), the male unemployment rate was 11% and the female unemployment rate was 14.2%, that is, 29% higher than the male.

Another and more striking aspect of social inequality is the unemployment among black people and brown people that is significantly higher than that of white people. In 2018, the second quarter of the 12.9 million unemployed, 52.3% were brown people, 35% white people and 11.8% black people. In this period the labor force was thus composed of: 47.9% were brown; 42.4% were white; and 8.5% were black. Ethnic/racial inequality also reveals itself in the unemployment rate: for an annual average of 12.4% in 2018, the rate of white self-declared was 9.9%; of black people, 15%; and of brown people, 14.4% (Brasil Econômico, 2018).

Other data show how gender and ethnic/racial issues are constitutive of Brazilian social inequality.

The data referred to when it came to HDI, it is worth noting that, when gender and skin color are juxtaposed, new differences arise. For example, in 2018, 23.5% of white women had high school education, more than twice that of black and brown women who were only 10.4% possessed it.

These differences are accentuated when the variable analyzed is the salary: according to IBGE, “even if working and studying more, women continue to receive **lower wages than men** [...] they earn, in average, 76.5% of the income of men” (Brasil Econômico, 2018a). This difference would be even greater when considering the labor market for holders of complete higher education diplomas: women's wages would be only 63.4% of men.

Add to this the so-called double women's working day: women spent on average 18 hours a week on household chores and personal care against 10 hours of men (73% more).

Finally, as for violence, according to the Atlas of Violence (Ipea, 2020), for a total of 56.6% of Afro-descendants in the population, in 2018, its members accounted for 75% of the deaths due to murder (57,956) in the country in this year. And of the total number of women murdered, also that year (4,519 or one every two hours), of which more than 30% per femicide, 68% were black.

Social inequality and higher education in Brazil

There will only be democracy in Brazil on the day when the machine that prepares democracies is set up in the country. This machine is that of public school (Anísio Teixeira).

Both intellectual educators and international organizations of different fields, throughout history and, in particular, of the last centuries, have been urging public education to advance democracy. This applies specifically to basic education, but since at least the beginning of the 19th century, with the University of Humboldt, this vastness could also be extended to ES.

However, if we take a careful look at the history and evolution of basic and higher education in Brazil, we will see that neither that, nor – especially – this, was taken as a priority in the construction of democracy, whether of the country as a nation.

In the case of basic education, it was only in the Federal Constitution of 1988 that its first phase – of elementary school – was recognized as a subjective right, that is, that compromises the State in its different instances with its universal offer. High school does not enjoy this prerogative. And much less the ES. This, in fact, started in the country, in the form of colleges, right after the arrival of the imperial family in 1808, fleeing the Napoleonic troops, to the colony of Portugal, only began to organize itself in the form of university, more than a century later, in 1920, with the University of Rio de Janeiro (today, centennial Federal University of Rio de Janeiro). It can be said that ES in Brazil, from the Empire and even throughout the Republic until the very recent years was always marked by elitism, “[...] either to ensure the qualification of state officials, or to ensure the supremacy of the ruling class(s) in the accumulation of capital and maintenance of power control” (Sguissardi, 2014, p. 208).

The massification of ES that occurred in the US in the early twentieth century and the great advances that occurred even in neighboring countries, such as Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, before and after World War II, were not accompanied in Brazil that, only in recent years, sees the percentage of 15% to 20% of net enrollment rate⁸ in ES be reached. In a country where little more than 50% of its young people aged 15 to 18 can complete high school, second phase of basic education, and in which about 85% of higher education institutions (HEIs) are private, of which about 60% are for profit, and where ES is not seen by the powers constituted as a priority, it is not surprising that almost 80% of young people aged 18 to 24 are outside any of its more than 2,500 HEIs.

In a Diagnostic Study of the Expansion Policy of (and Access to) Higher Education in Brazil – 2002–2012 (Sguissardi, 2014), for the National Council of Education, it was stated that:

The opposition of public and private-trade interests, (...) in the state's language, most likely explain why the right to ES remains a fundamental right of protection more fragile and why its coverage of the area is so small and its quality so uneven: high to a minority and low to the majority of those who, supposedly privileged, attend it (Sguissardi, 2014, p. 208)..

Today, however, in view of the reality exposed in the introduction of this text on the accentuated or extreme neoliberal traits of the shift governments since the impeachment/coup of August/2016, it can be said that private interests are accentuated within the State and explain the lack of expansion of public ES and the continuity of the expansion of the private sector at the national level.

⁸ “The net tuition fee (TLM) in higher education is an indicator of access to the educational system by a population considered at the reference age to attend a given level of education. In its classical definition, TLM considers only the percentage of the population of an age group enrolled in a level of education in relation to the total size of the population in this age group” (Brasil, 2020). In the case of ES, the age group considered appropriate is from 18 to 24 years.

The data from the Inep/MEC Higher Education Census from the years up to 2018, the continuous PNAD and other studies will serve to establish aspects of this relationship intended as the objective of this study.

The evolution of higher education during the dictatorship and in the three post-dictatorship presidential mandates

Table 5 shows the evolution of ES enrollments in Brazil during the period of the military dictatorship – 1964–1985. In 1964 there were only 164 thousand enrollment, 61% of which were public and 38% private. In the first 10 years – 1964–1974 – there was a growth of 559%, reaching almost one million enrollments (937,593), but reversing practically the public/private percentages: 36.4% public and 63.5% private. The following decade – 1974–1984 – was of poor growth: only 49%, or less than 10 times that of the previous decade, with a small increase in the public percentage: 40.9% against 59.1%. However, in the total of these two decades, for a total increase of 882.9%, public enrollment grew 552.3% and private enrollment, almost three times more, 1,412.5%.

Table 5 – Evolution of Brazilian ES enrollments by administrative category (public and private) – 1964–1984

Year	Total	Public enrollments		Private enrollments	
		Total	%	Total	%
1964	142,386	87,665	61.6	54,721	38.4
1974	937,593	341,028	36.4	596,565	63.5
1984	1,399,539	571,879	40.9	827,660	59.1
1964/1974 $\Delta\%$	558.5	289.0	–	990.1	–
1974/1984 $\Delta\%$	49.3	67.7	–	38.7	–
1964/1984 $\Delta\%$	882.9	552.3	–	1,412.5	–

Source: BRASIL. MEC/Inep. Statistical Synopsis of Higher Education, 2010. Table organized by the author in Sguissardi (2014).

Table 6 shows the evolution of both the number of public and private ES institutions and enrollments in the post-dictatorship period, the Sarney governments (1985–1989), Collor de Mello (1990–1992), Itamar Franco (1992–1994) and Fernando H. Cardoso – FHC (1995–1998).

This 14-year period was marked by a low growth in both the number of institutions and enrollments, although these were significantly higher than those. During the Sarney, Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco governments (1985–1994), the growth rate of institutions was negative, with the enrollment rate growing only 21.5%. The public and private enrollments had very close rates, with slight advantages for the public: 24% against 19.7%.

Table 6 – Evolution of the number of institutions and enrollments of ES by administrative category (public and private) – 1985–1998

Year	Number of Institutions					Number of Enrollments				
	Total	Public	%	Private	%	Total (thousand)	Public (thousand)	%	Private (thousand)	%
1985	859	233	27.1	626	72.9	1,367	557	40.7	810	59.3
1994	851	218	25.6	633	74.4	1,661	691	41.6	970	58.4
1998	973	209	21.4	764	78.6	2,125	804	37.8	1,321	62.2
1985–1994 $\Delta\%$	00.9	06.4	–	01.1	–	21.5	24.0	–	19.7	–
1994–1998 $\Delta\%$	14.3	04.1	–	20.7	–	27.9	16.5	–	36.2	–
1985–1998 $\Delta\%$	13.3	10.3	–	22.0	–	55.4	44.3	–	63.1	–

Source: BRASIL. MEC/Inep. Statistical Synopsis of Higher Education, 2010. Table organized by the author in Sguissardi (2014).

It is in the first FHC government (1995–1998) that, with total growth of institutions of 14.3% and enrollments of 27.9%, the growth of public institutions was negative (–04.1%) against a significant growth in private institutions (20.7%), and the public enrollments (16.5%) was lower than the private ones (36.2%).

It is evident in the period that there is a low growth in the number of institutions (13.3%), especially due to the decrease in the number of the public (–10.3%), and a median growth in enrollments, in which the primary enrollment increases by about 20 percentage points more than the public, in addition to private institutions having had a 22% increase in their number.

The evolution of the number of HEIs and enrollments from 1999 to 2018 and the process of private/commodification of higher education in Brazil

Although it is recognized, in the Federal Constitution of 1988, the possible existence of “schools” for profitable purposes, it will be the responsibility of Decree 2.207/97, in its Article 3rd, when it states that “the entities that maintain their interests for economic purposes submit to the legislation governing commercial companies, especially in the part concerning tax and tax related and labor charges” and, specifically, to Decree 2.306/97, the legal definition of the existence of higher education institutions and their for-profit maintainers, as defined in article 7th:

The private educational institutions, classified as private individuals in a strict sense, for profit purposes, even if of a civil nature, when maintained and administered by an individual, are subject to the regime of market legislation, regarding tax and tax related and labor charges, as if they were commercial, compared to their sponsors and administrators to the merchant on an individual behalf.

As shown in Table 7 (below), in 1999, only after a little more than a year of Decree 2.306/97, of the 905 private HEIs – 82.5% of the total of 1.097 HEIs of the country – 136 (12.4% of the total HEIs of the country) had already changed their statutes (with approval from the Ministry of Finance) from non-profit HEI to profitable HEI.

The approval of the Law of Guidelines and Bases of National Education (Law 9.394/96) and Decrees 2.207/97 and 2.306/97 were determining, on the one hand, of the very important increase in the number of HEIs that go from 1.097, in 1999, to 2.365, in 2010, With the triple growth of private HEIs in relation to the public; on the other hand, the exceptional growth, among the first HEIs, of the profit-making HEIs that from 136 (12% of the total country) in 1999, went to 946 (40%) in 2010. In 11 years, the private/commercial HEIs have increased by 696% against only 48% of non-commercial and 44.8% of public.

Table 7 – Evolution of the number of HEIs by administrative category: public (federal, state, municipal) private (for-profit – CFL; non-profit – SFL) and Special* – Brazil – 1999–2018

Ano	Número de Instituições																
	Total	Públicas						Privadas						Especiais			
		Total	%	Fed.	%	Est.	%	Mun.	%	Total	%	CFL	%	SFL	%	Qt	%
1999	1.097	192	17,5	60	5,4	72	6,5	60	5,4	905	82,5	136	12,4	769	70,1	-	-
2010	2.365	278	11,7	99	4,2	108	4,5	71	2,9	2.089	88,3	946	40,0	1.143	48,3	-	-
2018	2.537	299	11,8	110	4,3	128	5,0	61	2,4	2.238	88,2	1.303	51,4	935	36,8	25	0,9
1999-2010 Δ%	116,7	44,8	-	65,0	-	50,0	-	18,3	-	132,0	-	696,0	-	48,6	-	-	-
2010-2018 Δ%	6,7	7,6	-	12,0	-	18,5	-	-14,1	-	6,6	-	37,7	-	-18,0	-	-	-
1999-2018 Δ%	131,3	55,7	-	83,3	-	77,8	-	1,6	-	147,3	-	958,1	-	21,6	-	-	-

* Normative Ordinance number 40, December 12th, 2007. Special (art. 242 of the Federal Constitution) – an official educational institution created by state or municipal law and existing on the date of the promulgation of the Federal Constitution, which is not totally or preponderantly maintained with public resources, therefore not free.

Source: Microdata from the Census of Higher Education 1999, 2010 and 2018. Available at: www.inep.gov.br/microdados (contribution of Nelson Cardoso Amaral).

Table 8 – Evolution of the number of ES by administrative category: public (federal, state, municipal) private (for-profit – CFL; non-profit – SFL) and Special* – Brazil – 1999–2018

Ano	Número de Matrículas																
	Total	Públicas						Privadas						Especiais			
		Total	%	Fed.	%	Est.	%	Mun.	%	Total	%	CFL	%	SFL	%	Qt	%
1999	2.369.945	832.022	35,1	442.562	18,7	302.380	12,7	87.080	3,7	1.537.923	64,9	202.596	8,5	1.342.026	56,6	-	-
2010	6.379.299	1.643.298	25,7	938.656	14,7	601.112	9,4	103.530	1,6	4.736.001	74,3	2.066.473	32,4	2.697.589	42,3	-	-
2018	8.450.755	2.077.481	24,6	1.324.984	15,7	660.854	7,8	91.643	1,1	6.373.274	75,4	4.241.339	50,2	2.132.574	25,2	25.050	0,2
1999-2010 Δ%	169,2	97,5	-	112,1	-	98,8	-	18,9	-	207,9	-	919,9	-	101,0	-	-	-
2010-2018 Δ%	32,5	26,4	-	41,1	-	9,9	-	-11,5	-	34,6	-	105,2	-	-20,9	-	-	-
1999-2018 Δ%	256,6	149,7	-	199,4	-	118,6	-	5,2	-	314,4	-	1.993,5	-	58,9	-	-	-

* Normative Ordinance number 40, December 12th, 2007. Special (art. 242 of the Federal Constitution) – an official educational institution created by state or municipal law and existing on the date of the promulgation of the Federal Constitution, which is not totally or preponderantly maintained with public resources, therefore not free.

Source: Microdata from the Census of Higher Education 1999, 2010 and 2018. Available at: www.inep.gov.br/microdados (contribution of Nelson Cardoso Amaral).

The great leap in the expansion of HEIs in the country, as shown in Table 7, took place between 1999 and 2010. In the following eight years, the total index was only 6.7%, and it was slightly higher among the public ones (7.6%). The phenomenon that draws the most attention is that of the smaller increase in the total of private HEIs (6.6%), but with six times the growth of the HEIs for profit (37.7%) and an important reduction in the number of non-profit HEIs (–18%). This was due, as to a lesser degree in the previous phase (1999–2010), especially to the acquisition and incorporation of non-profit HEIs by profit-making HEIs.⁹

In the period 1999–2018, the following figures are also highlighted: 131% increase in the total of HEIs; 55.7% of public HEIs; 147.3% of private HEIs, but of these, 958.1% of those for profit against only 21.6% of non-profit ones.

Table 8 shows that the expansion of enrollments, in the period 1999–2018, was even more significant percentage rates than in the case of HEIs, both in the increase of total enrollments and in the total public enrollments (especially in federal and private HEIs) (especially for profit-making HEIs). This was due, in the case of federal HEIs, to the Program called Reuni (Program to Support Restructuring and Expansion Plans of Federal Universities) implemented from 2007 to 2012, which practically doubled the number of enrollments of federal HEIs in this period. In the case of private for-profit HEIs, it was due, in a special way, to the expansion of the offer of courses, by the cheapening of tuition and by the increase of the offer of distance education (EAD).

Table 8 highlights some data: 1) The increase in enrollment in practically all cases was substantially higher than that of the HEIs; 2) The period of much greater expansion was 1999–2010 compared to that of 2010–2018; 3) for a growth in enrollment in the period 1999–2018 of 256%, the public, even federal enrollments reached 199%, reached 149%, while private enrollments reached 314%, and of these, those of for-profit HEIs reached almost 2,000% (1,993.5%) compared to only 58.9% of private non-profit HEIs.

Undergraduate enrollments by sex and color/race

In the study of the evolution of higher education, two variables deserve to be observed: sex and color/race. In the case of the first, the censuses of higher education of the National Institute of Studies and Research (Inep), of MEC, have provided data for the three years that we take as references: 1999, 2010 and 2018. As for the second, color/race, we only find data from Inep for the year 2018 and some other sparse data from other sources.

Regarding gender, as already pointed out when it came to social inequalities, women tend to have higher education than men. In the case of higher education, Table 9 below shows that, in the period 1999–2018, female enrollments were higher than male enrollments in a range of 11.2–14 percentage points.

⁹ For a detailed view of these processes of purchase, merger, incorporation of small HEIs by medium-sized HEIs and by small and large-sized HEIs, see Sguissardi (2014).

Table 9 – Enrollments of Undergraduate Courses by Gender of Enrollees – Brazil – 1999–2018

Year	Total	Enrollments in male	Undergraduate %	Courses Female	%
1999	2,369,945	1,051,552	44.4	1,318,393	55.6
2010	5,449,120	2,432,816	44.6	3,016,304	55.4
2018	8,450,755	3,633,659	43.0	4,817,096	57.0

Source: Statistical Synopsis of Undergraduate Higher Education, 1999; INEP, 2000; Census of Higher Education, 2010; INEP, 2011; National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira, 2019 (Our elaboration from INEP” data).

As for the color/race variable and enrollment in higher education, although the participation of brown people and black people was close to that of the white people in the population composition, in 2005, their attendance to higher education was about three times lower: only 5.5% of black people and brown young people aged 18 to 24 were enrolled in this level of education, compared to 17.8% of white young people in this age group.

With the entry into force of Law 12.711/2012, of Social Quotas,¹⁰ in public universities (especially federal), in addition to other affirmative actions, as grants, cost-support for maintenance, there was a significant increase in the participation of afro-descendants in higher education in public institutions: In 2015, 12.8% were already young people aged 18 to 24 years old who were educated in this level of education compared to 26.5% of whites.

According to IBGE data, between 2000 and 2017 the chances of obtaining an undergraduate degree for young black and brown people in undergraduate degree would have multiplied almost five times, from 2.2%, from the population from 18 to 24 years, to 9.3%. This proportion among the young white people increased from 9.3% in 2000 to 22% in 2017 (Sguissardi, 2019).

Table 10 – Enrollments of Undergraduate Courses by color/race of enrollees (self-declared) – Brazil – 2018–2018

Category	Enrollments in Administrative Total			Courses Black or Brown	Undergraduate %	Not declared	%
	White %						
Brazil	8,450,755	3,533,562	41.8	3,027,572	35.8	1,660,792	19.6
Public	2,077,481	835,915	40.2	840,360	40.4	333,947	16.7
Federal	1,324,984	500,664	37.8	606,617	45.8	175,067	13.2
Private	6,373,274	2,697,647	42.3	2,187,212	34.3	1,326,845	20.8

Source: National Institute of Educational Studies and Research Anísio Teixeira, 2019 (author's elaboration).

The Census of Higher Education 2018, from Inep (2019) brings data that allow to verify the frequency to higher education by color/race. Although the percentage of “undeclared” is almost 20% (13.2% in federal HEIs and 20.8% in private HEIs), it is

¹⁰ This law requires universities, institutes and federal centers to reserve 50% of the vacancies offered in their selection processes to candidates entitled to quotas. The Quotas Law was enacted in 2012, but some universities (UnB, UERJ, UEMS and UNEB), about 10 years earlier, had already passed internal legislation with a sense quite similar to what would become the subject of this new law.

possible to raise the hypothesis that the Law of Quotas and other affirmative actions contributed to a significant advance in relation to the participation of black and brown people in the whole of the enrollments of higher education. In this table, the percentage of 1.6% of the yellow color/race and 0.60% of the indigenous are not considered.

For the following observations, it is necessary to remember that in 2018, the white people comprised about 43% of the Brazilian population; the black and brown people, 55%. Of the total of 8,450,755 enrolled in higher education, 41.8% declared themselves white and 35.8% black and brown people. Of the total of 2,077,481 enrolled people in public HEIs, the self-declared black and brown people (40.4%) slightly outnumber the self-declared white people (40.2%). Of the total of 6,373,274 enrolled in private HEIs, the self-declared white people (42.3%) exceeded the self-declared black and brown people (34.3%) by 8 percentage points. Finally, of the total of 1,324,984 enrolled in federal HEIs, self-declared white people (37.8%) were exceeded by self-declared black and brown people (45.8%) also, in the opposite direction, by 8 percentage points. In this case, if the 13.2% of “non-declared” were divided in proportion to the data of the self-declared, percentages would be reached quite close to those that reach each ethnicity in the population composition.

As it can be observed, the equal conditions of access to higher education, one of the conditions of democratization of this level of education, is still far from what is expected, although here it is seen, through the Law of Quotas and other affirmative actions, forms and paths to move forward in this direction.

Evolution of the Net Tuition Rate in Higher Education

One of the ways to verify the evolution of ES coverage is to observe the so-called net enrollment rate in ES of the population aged 18 to 24 years. The table below, which brings data from the PNAD (from 1992 to 2010) and the Census of Higher Education of the Inep (2011 to 2018), allows to verify such evolution.

Table 11 – Evolution of the Net Enrollment Rate in Higher Education – Brazil – 1999–2018

YEAR	Population from 18 to 24 years	Enrolled from 18 to 24 years old	Net rate of Enrolled people
1999	19,977,857	1,567,917	7.8
2010	23,873,786	3,188,000	13.4
2018	22,786,000	4,323,580	19.0
1999–2010 Δ%	19.5	103.3	71.8
2010–2018 Δ%	-04.5	35.6	41.8
1999–2018 Δ%	14.0	175.7	143.6

Source: PNAD (1999, 2010 and 2018). Available at: <www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/educacao/9127-pesquisa-nacional-por-amostra-de-domicilio.html> e Sinopse Estatística do Censo da Educação Superior. Available at: <www.inep.gov.br/sinop-ses-estatisticas-da-educacao-superior> (Elaboration of the autor and Nelson C. Amaral)

Table 11 data show that, despite a significant increase in the net rate in the period 1999–2018 in relation to the moderate growth of the population in the age group from 18 to 24 years (14% versus 143.6%), such an index (19%) is far from the target predicted by the National Education Plan 2014–2024, which is 33%.

On the other hand, the gross enrollment rate,¹¹ in 2018, of 37.4%, indicates that almost half of those enrolled in higher education in the country, that year, were outside the age group considered adequate for this level of education. And this, to a large extent, is due to grade-age disadjustments.

The most serious fact in this sense is in relation to the African population (black and brown people) [...] at the age of attending higher education [18–24 years], 52% of the blacks and brown people are still pursuing basic education (and often working), versus 29.1% of the white youth people (Sguissardi, 2019, p. 21)

Financing of higher education and *Future-se*

Since the impeachment/coup of President Dilma, public and private higher education, especially in its post-graduate level and research dimension, has ceased to have the degree of priority that had been having in the previous governments to this legal-political event of 2016. This can be assessed if the measures related to funding are examined, either from the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (MCTIC), to which the National Research Council (CNPq) is linked; or from the Coordination of Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES), responsible for the funding, regulation/evaluation and control of more than 4,400 graduate programs of all public and private higher education HEIs; or from the capital and expense of federal HEIs.

In the case of MCTIC, the budget cuts reduced the funds for the year 2020 to ¼ of their 2016 budget. Knowing that CNPq¹² “is responsible for financing more than 20 thousand research projects or 1/3 of the approximately 60 thousand research projects financed by different national and foreign funding agencies” (Sguissardi, 2020, p. 155), it can be said that loss similar to that of the execution of these projects will affect the published scientific production that stems from such projects, that is, “without participation of CNPq in the short and medium term this production would hardly probably see the light of the day” (Idem, *ibidem*).


The Budget Law for 2020 provided for a 40% reduction in Capes' resources for its operation and payment of grants and aids in relation to the 2019 budget (from about R\$ 4 billion to about R\$ 2.3 billion). See chart 4 below. “In 2020, Capes' budget will be around 25% of 2015,¹³ when the number of graduate programs was 2,057 against the current approximately 4,300 and that of masters and doctoral students was 163,671 against the current 400,000” (Sguissardi, 2020, p. 156).

¹¹ “The gross tuition fee (TBM) is defined as the total number of people attending undergraduate courses (regardless of age) in relation to the total age population considered adequate to attend this level of education” (BRASIL, 2020).

¹² See: <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ciencia/2019/08/sob-risco-de-colapso-cnpq-financia-um-terco-da-ciencia-nacional.shtml>. Access on: Sep. 12th 2019.

¹³ See <https://www.nexojornal.com.br/grafico/2019/09/05/Qual-%C3%A9-o-or%C3%A7amento-da-Capes-e-o-que-ele-representa-para-o-Brasil>

Chart 4 – CAPES' budget corrected by IPCA (IBGE) based on June of each year.



Source: <https://sintepiaui.org.br/noticia/442/O-orcamento-da-CAPES-para-2020-com-a-LOAS-do-novo-governo>. Access on: April 30th 2020. Art: Diagrama Editorial (SGUISSARDI, 2020, p. 156).

Chart 5 shows the evolution of resources from the three main sources of research and graduate funding in the country from 2000 to 2020. In 2020, resources will be smaller than those of 2006 and will account for only 31.5% of those of 2015.

Graph 5 – Budget of the main funds to support scientific and technological research in Brazil (FNDCT, CNPq and CAPES): 2000–2020 – [Total values provided for in the Annual Budget Law Project (PLOA) of each year, excluding contingency reserves].



Source: <http://www.abc.org.br/2019/09/11/liquide-se/>. Access on: April 30th 2020. Art: Diagrama Editorial (SGUISSARDI, 2020, p. 156).


Table 12 and Chart 6 show the evolution of the funding and capital/investment resources of federal universities (including university hospitals) from 2003 to 2019. In the case of costing, there was constant growth in the period 2003–2013; and in the case of capital/investment, in the period 2003–2011. The reduction of resources for funding begins in 2014 and reaches its lowest value in 2019, that is, –28% of the value of 2013. The reduction, initiated in 2012, but drastically aggravated from 2015, is that of the capital/investment resources that reach, in 2019, only 4.6% of the value of 2011 or a reduction of 95%.

Table 12 – Evolution of the Federal Government’s spending with federal universities in costing and capital/investment, including university hospitals, 2003–2020. Values (R\$ 1.00) at prices of January 2020 (IPCA).

	COSTING	INVESTMENTS
2003	2,406,419,011	225,902,062
2004	2,984,837,531	313,934,183
2005	3,167,364,854	428,912,289
2006	3,511,129,594	612,907,746
2007	4,093,093,831	1,161,226,589
2008	4,449,583,936	1,172,993,609
2009	5,396,034,453	2,693,813,334
2010	6,995,387,052	2,873,072,680
2011	7,566,516,281	3,923,391,801
2012	8,180,429,356	3,870,578,933
2013	9,888,804,484	3,676,725,381
2014	9,247,946,807	2,933,436,580
2015	7,931,202,805	864,037,764
2016	8,174,818,013	755,018,987
2017	7,598,729,143	548,093,079
2018	7,521,178,890	344,139,145
2019	7,123,033,264	182,274,168
2011–2019 Δ	-05.8	-95.4
2013–2019 Δ	-28.0	-95.0
2003–2019 Δ	196.0	-19.3

Sources: Chamber of Congressmen, 2020 (Elaboration of Epitácio Macário – UECE and the author).

Chart 6 – Evolution of the Federal Government’s spending with federal universities in costing and capital/investment (including university hospitals), 2003-2020. Values (R\$ 1.00) at prices of January 2020 (IPCA).



Sources: Chamber of Congressmen, 2020 (Elaboration of Eptácio Macário – UECE).

Future-se

In addition to the drastic reduction in the funding of federal HEIs, the federal government’s primary responsibility, via the Ministry of Education (MEC), as seen above, both for its “system” of 63 universities and 40 Federal Institutes, as for the agencies that finance and regulate/evaluate and control graduate and research linked to higher education in the country; giving consideration to the designs of Constitutional Amendment 95, which froze for 20 years the primary expenditure of the Federal Executive Branch, among which those devoted to education; and in the same “ultraliberal” perspective of PEC 188/2019–Senate (briefly explained in the introduction of this text), the masterpiece of the government, which was inaugurated in January 2019, in terms of the proposal for intervention in the federal HEIs has been the proposal called “Future-se”.

Against the backdrop of the neoliberal principles of competition and to prevail in all areas of the State, the Market and the sectors of society; the knowledge as goods, *commodity*, goods-value and the institutions of higher education and research as value-producing companies in which these “virtues” of competition and competitiveness apply; all this, combined with an anti-intellectualism, anti-scientism and anti-humanism, was connected to production by the MEC, under the command of the second Minister of Education of the Bolsonaro Government, identified with the neoliberal conceptions of the Minister of Economy (Paulo Guedes), from July 2019, in 1st version, in October, in 2nd version, in January 2020, in 3rd version, and, in the end of May 2020, in 4th version, the proposal of “Future-se”, then transacted in the Bill of Law (PL) n. 3076/2020 forwarded to the National Congress.

Briefly, this proposal for reform of federal HEIs aims to transform the structure and functioning of these institutions that, according to the Federal Constitution of 1988, “[...] enjoy didactic-scientific autonomy, administrative autonomy and financial and patrimonial management, and will obey the principle of indissociability among teaching, research and extension”, and that, according to the Law of Directives and Basis of National Education (Law 9.394/96), have ensured by the United Nations, annually, “sufficient resources for the maintenance and development of higher education institutions maintained by it” in institutions that would prioritize three axes of operation: I – Research, technological development and innovation; II – Entrepreneurship; III – Internationalization.

From all its four versions can be deduced: (a) a clear tendency to replace the current autonomy of financial management of federal HEIs with a supposed financial autonomy, and to replace, at least partially, the current attributions of the rector in the administration and financial management of these institutions by voluntary membership? – “Future” was” via “conclusion of a contract of result” between each Ifes and the MEC (Federal’s Government); b) that the reiterated call for technological research that produces innovation,¹⁴ which, in the spirit of “Future“, could be defined as[...] Profitable invention *safely and short-term*” for the market (OLIVEIRA, 2019, p. 2, author’s emphasis) and the abusive use of the terms entrepreneur and entrepreneurship¹⁵ make evident the entrepreneurial conception that led this reform proposal; c) that, depending on the weight of “Future-se” in all the research activities of the Ifes, it can be said that the teaching and research activities in the areas of social sciences, humanities, arts, as well as the basic research itself and the university extension are at serious risk of underfinancing, discredit and discouragement (Sguissardi, 2020).

Finally, it should be said that PL 3076 – 4th Version – No longer defend the use of Social Organizations as the backbone of the financial administration of the HEIs in which several types of contracts would be supported, such as previous versions, to now strengthen the presence and attribution of Institutional Support Foundations (private and already existing). In the evaluation of Roberto Leher,

However, the PL, like the scorpion of the fable, cannot hide its bolsonarist nature: it is inscribed in the cultural war, it is hostile to science, to university autonomy and to the freedom of chair and reaffirms the specific definition of the refunctionalization of institutions in “organizations” that are both predatory and innovative in a productive environment in which, as a rule, research and development (R&D) is scarce, devoid of origin and waning. Through these adjectives (entrepreneurial and innovative), it aims to change the social function of universities before the problems of the peoples, the democratic challenges – political and economic – of the nation and the logical and epistemological problems of knowledge. Upon trying to imprison the university as a utilitarian organization, it aims to radically suppress the freedom of professorship (Leher, 2020).

¹⁴ The word innovation was used 32 times in the PL proposal on its 16 pages.

¹⁵ These terms were used 36 times in the PL proposal.

Leher also replies why a PL of this nature is proposed and the way it was:

PL is made to shape the budget of MEC to the restrictions of the “iron law” instituted by EC 95/2016 which, due to the crisis, will be even more draconian [...] That is, due to the restrictions established by EC 95, the alternative [offered by Future-se...] it is a market capture, as if it were desirable and possible” (Leher, 2020).

As if that were to keep the university autonomous in teaching, research and extension...

Final considerations

In this text, succinctly, it was intended to show, with a series of empirical research and various examples, the validity of political and neoliberal-economic conceptions and practices in the country that contribute decisively to the production and increase of social inequality, as well as to somehow delay the democratization of higher education.

As for the neoliberal and “ultra-liberal” conceptions and practices, the cited examples of the Constitutional amendments and laws approved by the National Congress, from the impeachment/coup of 2016 until the present date of 2020, and the content of at least one of the PEC’s in progress in the CN, on the initiative of the Executive and parliamentarians, it is believed that they are sufficient to demonstrate the strengthening of the exploitation power of the ruling political-entrepreneurial class the destruction of the rights of hard-fought workers over decades of their claims. Labour and social security reforms are representative of what comes from being said.

As for the scenario of the extreme and growing Brazilian social inequality, the statement of the Oxfam-Brazil report, set out above in the above-mentioned item, illustrates well what other indicators of national and multilateral organizations point and detail about the serious reality of this inequality, with a tendency to worsen even more if the current extreme neoliberal policies in the country continue.

Many other aspects, besides those exposed, could be highlighted to show the severity of Brazilian social inequality. However, the highlights that was were given to household income per capita (2012–2018), the unequal occupation and income among men and women, among the white and afro descent people, among others, served to illustrate why Brazil is just behind Qatar, as a country that presents “[...] the second largest concentration of income in the world.”

With the second item of this text – “Social inequality and higher education in Brazil” – aimed to present some elements that demonstrate what was proposed as the objective of this article, that is, to show that this level of education continues to maintain, in recent decades, and especially since the 2016 presidential impeachment, a very close relationship with the immense social disloyalty in the country and, eventually, to reproduce it and contribute to, in its way, aggravate the absence of effective democracy in the Brazilian society, which is translated, in particular, for this growing inequality.

The presentation of this objective for this brief study was then emphasized, that a society in which the social and infinite differences of opportunities, for example, of access to

the ES of individuals belonging to their different social classes are immeasurable. And that access to the ES of only 1/5 of the population aged 18 to 24 years did not depend heavily on family or personal disposition/will, but rather on the absolute absence of socioeconomic conditions of the vast majority of the population.

This is easily demonstrated by the data presented in item 1 – a sample of the immense Brazilian social inequality – but, especially, by the evolution of the net enrollment rate in the ES (Table 11), by the indices listed by the private-mechanization process of higher education (Tables 7 and 8), among others. Table 11 shows that if, in 1999, the HEIs for profit purposes were 12.4% of the total, in 2018, they were already 51% or

1,303 of the 2,537 HEIs of the country. And that added to the 935 (36.8%) private non-profit HEIs make up 2,238 or 88.2% of the total HEIs of the country. Since public and free HEIs are only 11.8% (already 27.1% in 1985 and 17.5% in 1999) of the total and high competition in their selective entrance examinations, they are for the majority of the population aged 18 to 24 years, most of them from the public middle school, the other 2,238 private HEIs with or without profit, but paid and generally less quality than public HEIs.

Although the proportion of public and private enrollments differs from the proportion of the number of institutions, since among public HEIs predispose those organized as universities (Table 8), also in this case, the trend of lower growth in the number of public enrollments than private enrollments has occurred over the past few decades: in 1985, public enrollments were 40.7%; in 1999, 35.1%; and in 2018, 24.6%. The opposite occurred with the private enrollments, which increased from 59.3% in 1985 to 75.4% in 2018, with emphasis on enrollment in IES for profit, which increased from 8.5% in 1999 to 50.2% of the total in 2018.

It is worth mentioning two facts: 1) that women for several decades have been a significant majority in higher education (Table 9), which, as seen, has not prevented the fact that in the labor market they have indentations of unemployment and income of about 40% lower than men; 2) that black people and brown people, with the Law of Quotas and other affirmative actions, are beginning to see recognized their right of equal access to ES, to begin with the federal HEIs (Table 10), although there are no studies to verify whether there are advances in permanence (choice of professions) and dispute of the graduates in the labor market.

Finally, the relationship of higher education, in particular public higher education, graduate and research with the reproduction, reduction or expansion of social inequality can be measured by priority or non-priority given to budgetary decisions and proposals for reform. Among these are the budget cuts of MCTIC (which included CNPq) and CAPES (Charts 4 and 5), the expenses of the Federal Government of costing and capital for federal universities (Table 12) as well as proposals such as PL 3076/2020 (Future-se).

To conclude and paraphrasing the statement of Master Anísio in the epigraph of item 2 of this text, it will be said that there will only be effective advances in the democratization of the country on the day that its immense social inequality is reduced, if the basic education, including high school, is universalized. and democratize access, permanence in higher education and access to the labor market, of the graduates, without discrimination of any kind.

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